Skip to content
    Back to the homepage

    CRYPTODAM · EDITORIAL EVIDENCE

    Market incidents & policy context.

    A curated, sourced archive of service interruptions, security incidents, stablecoin stresses and policy developments. Each record keeps its event, source, update and review dates separate.

    12 records shown

    Newest event first; disclosure date is used when the occurrence is unknown, then source publication date. Policy records use their publication date. Later updates stay attached to the original case.

    Binance logo

    Subject identificationBinance logo, identifying the exchange discussed in this case.

    Binance logo · vector: Kripto Borsaları · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    SecurityGlobal

    Event · UTC

    Binance security incident: funding and withdrawal recovery

    Binance reported approximately US$6.34 billion in affected assets after its October 29 security incident. Its November 12 announcement said company-funded coverage of the affected assets was complete.

    Affected assets
    Approx. US$6.34 billionFigure as of

    Status as of

    On November 14, Binance reported reopening withdrawals on 87 networks while phased restoration continued. Funding completion and full service availability are separate facts.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    CryptoDam design objective: maintain distinct evidence and decision records for affected assets, financial coverage, and actual service availability.

    Substantive updates

    1. Theft on or about October 29 and the government attribution.

    2. October 29 occurrence and the affected-asset estimate.

    3. Completion of affected-asset funding and phased withdrawal restoration; published November 12 and signed November 13.

    4. Withdrawals reopened on 87 networks, with restoration continuing elsewhere.

    Source records

    1. Incident and affected-asset report (opens in a new tab)

      Binance · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: October 29 occurrence and the affected-asset estimate.

      Content reviewed

    2. Funding-completion announcement (opens in a new tab)

      Binance · Primary source · Source published

      Signed

      Supports: Completion of affected-asset funding and phased withdrawal restoration; published November 12 and signed November 13.

      Content reviewed

    3. Withdrawal-restoration update (opens in a new tab)

      Binance · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Withdrawals reopened on 87 networks, with restoration continuing elsewhere.

      Content reviewed

    4. FBI incident notice (opens in a new tab)

      FBI · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Theft on or about October 29 and the government attribution.

      Content reviewed

    Bithumb logo (2018 source file)

    Subject identificationBithumb logo, identifying the exchange in this case. The source file dates to 2018 and does not establish its current branding.

    Bithumb logo: Bithumb · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    SecurityKorea

    Event · KST

    Bithumb internal-workplace-system data disclosure

    After the FSC's October 28 initial release, Bithumb confirmed customer information was included in the October 27 internal-workplace-system breach. The company said it had not found direct compromise of exchange services or its customer database.

    Status as of

    The November 13 update distinguished 6,444 customers’ records: 5,600 encrypted/unreadable and 844 exposed, plus 715 staff/contractors. Investigation and support continued.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update
    Occurrence window
    – · KST

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    CryptoDam design objective: retain dated evidence updates and distinguish confirmed data exposure from unsubstantiated customer-asset theft.

    Substantive updates

    1. Employee-information indications and the then-pending customer-data investigation as of October 28.

    2. Subsequently established event window, encrypted versus exposed customer records, and investigation/support status.

    Source records

    1. FSC initial intrusion disclosure (opens in a new tab)

      Financial Services Commission · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Employee-information indications and the then-pending customer-data investigation as of October 28.

      Content reviewed

    2. Bithumb customer-data disclosure update (opens in a new tab)

      Bithumb · Primary source · Source published

      Source updated

      Supports: Subsequently established event window, encrypted versus exposed customer records, and investigation/support status.

      Content reviewed

    Bitget 2026 logo

    Subject identificationBitget’s 2026 logo, identifying the exchange discussed in the security-incident report.

    Bitget logo: Bitget · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    SecurityGlobal

    Event

    Bitget exchange security incident

    Bitget reported approximately US$387.5 million transferred to attacker-controlled addresses during its September 24 incident. The revised estimate reflected fuller accounting, not additional theft after containment.

    Assets transferred to attacker-controlled addresses
    Approx. US$387.5 millionFigure as of

    Status as of

    The October 2 announcement reported completion of phased withdrawal, fiat, and C2C service restoration. This dated service update does not establish ultimate customer losses.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    CryptoDam design objective: preserve an auditable distinction between preliminary estimates, revised accounting, containment, and service restoration.

    Substantive updates

    1. September 24 occurrence and revised accounting of assets transferred to attacker-controlled addresses.

    2. Completion of phased withdrawal, fiat, and C2C service restoration.

    Source records

    1. Incident transfer accounting (opens in a new tab)

      Bitget · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: September 24 occurrence and revised accounting of assets transferred to attacker-controlled addresses.

      Content reviewed

    2. Service-restoration announcement (opens in a new tab)

      Bitget · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Completion of phased withdrawal, fiat, and C2C service restoration.

      Content reviewed

    English-language conceptual diagram of fiat-backed stablecoin prices and mint/redemption arbitrage

    Conceptual illustrationEnglish-language concept diagram: a fiat-backed stablecoin can be minted at $1 when its market price is above par and redeemed at $1 when below par. It does not depict StablR’s actual system or price data from this incident.

    Diagram: Sibshops · CC0 1.0 · Wikimedia Commons · CC0 1.0 (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Full diagram rendered and resized from SVG to PNG by Wikimedia Commons. No edits or translation of the diagram’s English labels by CryptoDam.

    Issuance / redemptionGlobal

    Event

    StablR EURR/USDR issuance and redemption suspension

    Following the May 24 EURR/USDR security incident, StablR suspended minting and redemption. Its November 6 notice reported filing a court application for dissolution and winding-up.

    Status as of

    As of that notice, issuance and redemption remained suspended, while reserves for lawfully issued tokens were held separately. The filing does not establish completed liquidation.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    CryptoDam design objective: distinguish market prices from issuance/redemption availability and review eligible holdings against explicit product conditions.

    Substantive updates

    1. May 24 occurrence, suspended issuance/redemption, segregated lawful-token reserves, and the court application.

    Source records

    1. Issuance and redemption update (opens in a new tab)

      StablR · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: May 24 occurrence, suspended issuance/redemption, segregated lawful-token reserves, and the court application.

      Content reviewed

    Coinbase logo

    Subject identificationCoinbase logo, identifying the exchange discussed in the service-disruption report.

    Coinbase logo: Coinbase · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    Service interruptionGlobal

    Event · US Eastern

    Coinbase disruption across major services

    Coinbase's postmortem described roughly eight hours of unavailability or degradation across major services on May 7, followed by further recovery work.

    Major-service interruption or degradation
    Approx. 8 hoursFigure as of

    Status as of

    Recovery times varied by function. The report describes another twelve hours for full system recovery; this was not a uniform twenty-hour shutdown.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    CryptoDam design objective: assess incidents using explicit affected-function evidence, observation times, and predefined duration criteria.

    Substantive updates

    1. Approximately eight hours of major-service interruption/degradation and staged, function-specific recovery.

    Source records

    1. May 7 outage postmortem (opens in a new tab)

      Coinbase · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Approximately eight hours of major-service interruption/degradation and staged, function-specific recovery.

      Content reviewed

    Bithumb logo (2018 source file)

    Subject identificationBithumb logo, identifying the exchange in this case. The source file dates to 2018 and does not establish its current branding.

    Bithumb logo: Bithumb · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    Operational errorKorea

    Event · KST

    Bithumb erroneous reward credits

    Bithumb reported erroneous Bitcoin reward credits during an event on 6 February 2026. The FSC separately described the payment error and regulatory response.

    Status as of

    On 8 February, Bithumb announced asset reconciliation, including use of company assets, and the start of compensation payments. This does not establish that every compensation payment was complete.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update
    Occurrence window
    · KST

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: connect ledger/wallet reconciliation evidence with accountable review and approval records.

    Substantive updates

    1. February 6 at 19:00 occurrence, reconciliation using company assets, and commencement of compensation.

    2. The reward-credit error and inspection response; the February 7 meeting was published on February 9.

    Source records

    1. Reward-error remediation and compensation (opens in a new tab)

      Bithumb · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: February 6 at 19:00 occurrence, reconciliation using company assets, and commencement of compensation.

      Content reviewed

    2. FSC inspection-response release (opens in a new tab)

      Financial Services Commission · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: The reward-credit error and inspection response; the February 7 meeting was published on February 9.

      Content reviewed

    Upbit logo

    Subject identificationUpbit logo, identifying the exchange discussed in the asset-outflow report.

    Upbit logo: Upbit · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    SecurityKorea

    Event · KST

    Upbit Solana-network asset outflow

    Quoting Dunamu, Yonhap reported a revised total of approximately KRW 44.5 billion for the 27 November 2025 incident, covering company and customer assets.

    Affected assets, including company and customer assets
    Approx. KRW 44.5 billionFigure as of

    Status as of

    Dunamu said approximately KRW 38.6 billion of affected customer assets had been fully replenished using company assets. This is the company account reported by Yonhap.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: distinguish affected assets from customer-replenishment status.

    Substantive updates

    1. The revised KRW 44.5 billion total and company-reported replenishment of KRW 38.6 billion in customer assets.

    Source records

    1. Yonhap report quoting Dunamu (opens in a new tab)

      Yonhap News Agency · Secondary reporting · Source published

      Supports: The revised KRW 44.5 billion total and company-reported replenishment of KRW 38.6 billion in customer assets.

      Content reviewed

    Binance logo

    Subject identificationBinance logo, identifying the exchange discussed in this case.

    Binance logo · vector: Kripto Borsaları · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    Stablecoin price deviationGlobal

    Event · UTC

    Binance collateral-price dislocations

    During volatility on 10 October 2025, Binance reported price dislocations affecting USDe, BNSOL and WBETH collateral. BNSOL and WBETH are not dollar stablecoins.

    Compensation paid for the relevant collateral-price dislocations
    Approx. US$283 millionFigure as of

    Status as of

    On 12 October, Binance reported approximately US$283 million paid in compensation for affected collateral-price dislocations. This is not a measure of total market losses.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: review venue-specific prices, multiple sources and deviation duration separately.

    Substantive updates

    1. Approximately US$283 million paid for USDe/BNSOL/WBETH collateral-price dislocations. Other internal-transfer/redemption-delay claims remained under review in that statement.

    Source records

    1. Binance collateral-dislocation compensation (opens in a new tab)

      Binance · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Approximately US$283 million paid for USDe/BNSOL/WBETH collateral-price dislocations. Other internal-transfer/redemption-delay claims remained under review in that statement.

      Content reviewed

    Bithumb logo (2018 source file)

    Subject identificationBithumb logo, identifying the exchange in this case. The source file dates to 2018 and does not establish its current branding.

    Bithumb logo: Bithumb · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    Service interruptionKorea

    Event Approx. · KST

    Bithumb emergency system interruption

    Bithumb said emergency maintenance interrupted service for approximately 90 minutes from around 23:30 KST on 2 September 2025.

    Maintenance duration in the official notice
    Approx. 90 minutesFigure as of

    Status as of

    Its September 3 apology set out compensation applications and review. The notice does not establish when all compensation payments were completed.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update
    Occurrence window
    · KST

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: record affected functions, observed times and predefined duration criteria.

    Substantive updates

    1. Approximately 23:30 KST September 2 start, roughly 90 minutes of maintenance, and compensation applications/review.

    Source records

    1. Maintenance apology and compensation applications (opens in a new tab)

      Bithumb · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Approximately 23:30 KST September 2 start, roughly 90 minutes of maintenance, and compensation applications/review.

      Content reviewed

    Service interruptionKorea

    Event · KST

    Korbit prolonged service interruption

    Yonhap reported restricted Korbit orders, execution and access from 14:30 KST on 16 June to 03:00 KST on 17 June 2025, about 12.5 hours from the reported times.

    Duration calculated from reported times
    Approx. 12.5 hoursFigure as of

    Status as of

    Trading reportedly resumed at 03:00 KST on 17 June. Korbit attributed the interruption to an internal network problem and denied hacking or customer-data leakage.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update
    Occurrence window
    – · KST

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: review function-specific interruption and recovery times with their evidence.

    Substantive updates

    1. Reported order/execution restrictions and restoration times, and the company explanation of an internal network issue.

    Source records

    1. Korbit interruption and recovery report (opens in a new tab)

      Yonhap News Agency · Secondary reporting · Source published

      Supports: Reported order/execution restrictions and restoration times, and the company explanation of an internal network issue.

      Content reviewed

    Bybit logo

    Subject identificationBybit logo, identifying the exchange discussed in the February 2025 theft report.

    Bybit logo · public domain (simple logo) · Wikimedia Commons · PD-textlogo (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Original Wikimedia Commons file; no edits by CryptoDam.

    SecurityGlobal

    Event Approx. · UTC

    Bybit virtual-asset theft

    The FBI reported approximately US$1.5 billion in virtual assets stolen from Bybit on or about 21 February 2025. The theft amount does not establish ultimate customer losses.

    Virtual assets stolen, as reported by the FBI
    Approx. US$1.5 billionFigure as of

    Status as of

    Bybit’s later timeline says the ETH shortfall was covered on 24 February. Funding the shortfall is distinct from recovering all stolen assets.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: distinguish outflow evidence, reserve replenishment and customer-protection status.

    Substantive updates

    1. Approximately US$1.5 billion stolen in virtual assets on or about February 21.

    2. The company account of covering the ETH shortfall on February 24, distinct from recovering stolen assets.

    Source records

    1. FBI/IC3 Bybit theft advisory (opens in a new tab)

      FBI / IC3 · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: Approximately US$1.5 billion stolen in virtual assets on or about February 21.

      Content reviewed

    2. Bybit incident-response timeline (opens in a new tab)

      Bybit · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: The company account of covering the ETH shortfall on February 24, distinct from recovering stolen assets.

      Content reviewed

    Entrance to Silicon Valley Bank’s Santa Clara, California headquarters, photographed on 13 March 2023

    Context photographSilicon Valley Bank headquarters, photographed on 13 March 2023 during the period discussed in the USDC/SVB record. It does not depict USDC trading or the depeg itself.

    Photo: Minh Nguyen · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 (opens in a new tab) · Image source (opens in a new tab)

    Image details

    Full photograph resized to 960×720 by Wikimedia Commons; no cropping or edits by CryptoDam. Image adaptations must retain CC BY-SA 4.0 or a compatible license.

    Stablecoin price deviationGlobal

    Event

    USDC/SVB reserve stress

    Historical background

    The March 2023 SVB episode exposed US$3.3 billion of Circle’s USDC reserve deposits. This figure describes reserve exposure, not a realized loss.

    USDC reserve deposits held at SVB
    US$3.3 billionFigure as of

    Status as of

    Circle’s 13 March publication described deposit availability following depositor protection and the depeg closing. This historical episode predates CryptoDam’s 2024 filing.

    Evidence & updates
    Source published
    Latest substantive update

    CryptoDam’s interpretation / design objective

    Design objective: distinguish market-price deviations from issuer reserve and redemption status.

    Substantive updates

    1. US$3.3 billion of SVB reserve deposits, availability after depositor protection, and the depeg-closing statement.

    Source records

    1. Circle SVB reserve update (opens in a new tab)

      Circle · Primary source · Source published

      Supports: US$3.3 billion of SVB reserve deposits, availability after depositor protection, and the depeg-closing statement.

      Content reviewed

    Theft, compensation, affected assets and reserve exposure measure different things. They are never added into a combined loss total.

    Build the next protection workflow with us.

    For exchanges, insurers, financial institutions, public agencies and partners exploring investor protection in Korea and international markets.